01837nam a2200241Ia 4500003000400000005001700004008004100021020001800062040002100080041000800101082002600109100002900135245006100164260003400225300003400259500003700293504003800330505033400368520076200702650004701464650003101511650005301542OSt20210813114011.0210310s2007 eu fr 000 0 eng d a9783540482666 aCO-JMCRcCO-JMCR0 aeng04a332.6323 /bF911r2231 aFriedl, Gunther, eautor10aReal options and investment incentives /cGunther Friedl aNew York : bSpringer, c2007 axi, 119 páginas ; c24 cm. aIncluye notas a pie de página. aBibliografía: páginas 109-1190 aInstitutional and Methodological Background for the Analysis of Investment Incentives -- Capital Rationing as an Incentive Instrument for Growth Options -- Residual Income as a Performance Measure for Switching Options -- Residual Income as a Performance Measure in the Presence of Waiting Options -- Implications and conclusions3 aMany large corporations delegate investment decision making authority to their divisions. Because they are better informed, divisional managers should be able to make better decisions than corporate headquarters. However, they can use this informational advantage to pursue their own inter ests. The objective of this work is to analyze the problem of delegated decision-making within firms when investment projects are characterized by the possibility to make sub sequent decisions after the initial investment decision has been made. By analyzing this question, the monograph com bines and unifies two important lines of literature: on the one hand the literature on controlling investment decisions, on the other hand the investment valuation literature.14aInversiones de capitalxToma de decisiones24aOpciones reales (Finanzas)24aModelos matemáticosxValoraciónxInversiones