000			01910nam a2200265Ia 4500
003			OSt
005			20210813114011.0
008			210310s2007 eu fr 000 0 eng d
020			_a9783540482666
040			_aCO-JMCR _cCO-JMCR
041	0		_aeng
082	0	4	_a332.6323 / _bF911r _223
100	1		_aFriedl, Gunther, _916884 _eautor
245	1	0	_aReal options and investment incentives / _cGunther Friedl
260			_aNew York : _bSpringer, _c2007
300			_axi, 119 páginas ; _c24 cm.
500			_aIncluye notas a pie de página.
504			_aBibliografía: páginas 109-119
505	0		_aInstitutional and Methodological Background for the Analysis of Investment Incentives -- Capital Rationing as an Incentive Instrument for Growth Options -- Residual Income as a Performance Measure for Switching Options -- Residual Income as a Performance Measure in the Presence of Waiting Options -- Implications and conclusions
520	3		_aMany large corporations delegate investment decision making authority to their divisions. Because they are better informed, divisional managers should be able to make better decisions than corporate headquarters. However, they can use this informational advantage to pursue their own inter ests. The objective of this work is to analyze the problem of delegated decision-making within firms when investment projects are characterized by the possibility to make sub sequent decisions after the initial investment decision has been made. By analyzing this question, the monograph com bines and unifies two important lines of literature: on the one hand the literature on controlling investment decisions, on the other hand the investment valuation literature.
650	1	4	_aInversiones de capital _916886 _xToma de decisiones
650	2	4	_aOpciones reales (Finanzas) _939367
650	2	4	_aModelos matemáticos _xValoración _xInversiones _939368
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c8299 _d8299